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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURY CASES
David R. Owen* & J. Marks Moore, III**
INTRODUCTION
For more than thirty years,' the controversy concerning com-
parative negligence has raged in the state courts, legislatures, and
law reviews. Thirty-eight states, including all but six of the "saltwater"
and Great Lakes states,' have adopted comparative negligence in one
of its several forms by court decision3 or by statute.4 The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act' (UCFA) has been drafted by a committee of
experts and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws; yet, it has not been adopted in any jurisdic-
tion. The legal literature has been modified slightly,' but the commen-
tators appear unanimous in their approval of comparative negligence
in its "pure" form.7
In admiralty, the movement toward comparative negligence
started at an early date in the form of equal division of damages in
collision cases.' In 1890, the United States Supreme Court abolished
every vestige of the common law bar of contributory negligence in
maritime personal injury cases.9 In 1920, Congress effectively
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Maryland Bar. Past President, The Maritime Law Association of the
United States.
** Member, Maryland Bar.
1. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953).
2. Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
3. Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico and West Virginia.
The most recent examples are Illinois, Alvis v. Rybar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886
(1981), and New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
4. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. The most recent examples are Louisiana, LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (effective 1980),
and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1980).
5. UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 33 (1979).
6. See Abraham, Adopting Comparative Negligence: Some Thoughts for the Late
Reformer, 41 MD. L. REV. 300 (1982); Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development
in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299 (1980).
7. For a discussion of the various forms of comparative negligence, see Digges
& Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REV. 276,
278-82 (1982).
8. For all practical purposes, this would be the Laws of Oleron, originating about
1150 A.D. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 401 n.3, 1975 A.M.C.
541, 545 n.3 (1975). The doctrine of equal division of damages in collision cases was
adopted by the Supreme Court in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 170 (1855).
9. The Max Morris v. Curry, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
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established pure comparative negligence as the rule for seamen's per-
sonal injury and death cases in suits against employers and for all
cases of wrongful death on the high seas. In 1975, the Supreme Court
adopted the rule of comparative negligence in collision and stranding
cases." The cumulative effect of these judicial and statutory decisions
has been to make admiralty a "pure" comparative negligence jurisdic-
tion in connection with every type of maritime tort. Admiralty courts
have been reasonably successful in reconciling common law concepts
with the doctrine of comparative negligence. By comparision, the state
courts and legislatures generally have fallen far short of constructing
a complete doctrine. Apparently, the only attempt to construct a
coherent statutory scheme has been the UCFA, which is for all prac-
tical purposes a "restatement" of the law of comparative negligence.
This article will examine various elements of the doctrine of com-
parative negligence in maritime personal injury and death situations,
as well as the reconciliation of this doctrine with such common law
concepts as assumption of risk, last clear chance, and joint and several
liability.
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFFS
AND NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS
In 1908, Congress passed the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)." The FELA, which was applicable to interstate railroads, pro-
vided recovery for injury or death "resulting in whole or in part from
the negligence" of the carrier." The FELA incorporated the doctrine
of comparative neglience in section 53, which provided that "the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to such employee."' 4 The legislative history
of the FELA cites sparse statutory precedent and no judicial
precedents, but refers to this principle as "ideal justice, against which
no fair argument can be made."'5 This type of comparative negligence
is termed "pure comparative negligence.""
10. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1976); Death
on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. SS 761-768 (1976). The Jones Act incorporates
the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, which provides for comparative negligence.
See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 A.M.C. 541 (1975).
12. 45 U.S.C. SS 51-60 (1976).
13. Id. S 51.
14. Id. S 53.
15. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, at 4 (1908).
16. There are at least four forms of "modified comparative negligence," none of
which has existed in admiralty since the divided damages rule was abolished by United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 A.M.C. 541 (1975). See Digges &
Klein, supra note 7, at 278-82.
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Subsequently, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
often referred to as the Jones Act. The Jones Act incorporated the
provisions of the FELA, making it applicable to seamen in suits against
their employers for negligence. Although the Jones Act makes no
specific reference to comparative negligence, the FELA rule is so clear
and simple that courts have had little or no problem in its practical
application.
In the jurisprudence, the doctrine of comparative negligence in
maritime personal injury cases was developed gradually by the lower
federal courts following The Max Morris v. Curry,8 in which the
Supreme Court declined to address the question of apportionment of
damages and held only that contributory negligence was not a bar
to recovery. In The Lackawanna," the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York became the first court to
apportion fault on a percentage basis in a maritime personal injury
case. The plaintiff passenger, although negligent, was awarded one-
third of his damages, the court citing The Max Morris without
discussion." In The Alcazar," although a property damage case, the
court referred to The Max Morris and the FELA as indicating that
"the doctrine of comparative negligence" applied in noncollision cases.'
In Grimberg v. Admiral Oriental S.S. Line,3 where a plaintiff seaman
sued his employer under the Jones Act, the court referred to The
Max Morris, the FELA, and the Jones Act as abolishing contributory
negligence and providing for comparative negligence. More recently,
in Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transportation Co., 4 the Second Cir-
cuit applied the doctrine of comparative negligence to a linehandler,
noting that lower courts had "filled the gap" left by The Max Morris.
The court further commented that a status or statutory relationship
with the defendant was not a necessary condition of apportionment.25
The Supreme Court has never decided a personal injury case man-
17. 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1976).
18. 137 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890). A longshoreman employed by a stevedore was en-
gaged in loading coal aboard a vessel and fell through an unguarded opening in the
after-end lower bridge rail. The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the
longshoreman's injuries resulted partly from his own negligence and partly from the
negligence of the officers of the vessel. The Supreme Court affirmed, declining to deter-
mine whether the decree should have been for exactly one-half of the damages sus-
tained or, in the court's discretion, for a greater or lesser proportion of such damages.
19. 151 F. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
20. Id. at 501.
21. 227 F. 633 (E.D.N.C. 1915).
22. Id. at 663.
23. 300 F. 619, 1924 A.M.C. 1241 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
24. 214 F.2d 618, 1954 A.M.C. 1504 (2d Cir. 1954).
25. 214 F.2d at 621-22, 1954 A.M.C. at 1507-09.
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dating the application of comparative negligence; the Court has merely
recited its existence.'
Covered Employee" Under the Longshoremen's Act versus "Vessel"28
Although there is no mention of comparative negligence in the
Lonshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Longshore-
men's Act), 9 it was the subject of discussion in 1972 by the Senate
and House committees considering the proposed amendments to the
Act. The House Report states: "[Tihe Committee intends that the ad-
miralty concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common
law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases where the
injured employee's own negligence may have contributed to causing
the injury."3
In an action under section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's Act,3 the
doctrine of comparative negligence applies.32 A complex skein of rights
26. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 629, 1959
A.M.C. 597 (1959) (invitee); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09, 1954
A.M.C. 1, 6 (1953) (longshoreman); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429,
1939 A.M.C. 1, 5-6 (1939) (seaman); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122, 1936
A.M.C. 627, 633 (1936) (seaman).
27. See 33 U.S.C. S 902(3) (1976). For ease of reference all covered employees will
be described as "longshoremen," although they may actually be shipyard workers or
other harbor workers.
28. Id. S 902(21).
29. 33 U.S.C. SS 901-950 (1976).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4705. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,
409-10, 1954 A.M.C. 1, 6-7 (1953); Stover & Plaetzer, Comparative Negligence and the
Harbor Worker's Act-History, Examination, Diagnosis and Treatment, 63 MARQ. L.
REV. 349, 349-445 (1980). Section 905(b), in its entirety, was added to the
Longshoremen's Act as part of the 1972 amendments.
31. 33 U.S.C. S 905(b). Under the Longshoremen's Act, a longshoreman injured
in the course and scope of his employment is entitled to receive immediate compensa-
tion from his employer. He may sue the employer if compensation is not forthcoming.
In addition to receiving compensation under the Act, the longshoreman may proceed
against any negligent third party who may have been responsible for his injuries.
The most frequent third party is, of course, the vessel on which the longshoreman
was working. Until Congress amended the Longshoremen's Act in 1972, the
longshoreman could bring a third-party action against the vessel based on unseawor-
thiness, negligence, or the vessel owner's breach of his duty to provide the longshoreman
with a safe place to work. The vessel owner, in turn, could seek indemnity from the
longshoreman's stevedore-employer based either on a theory of breach of the employer's
implied warranty of workmanlike performance or on a contractual indemnity provi-
sion. In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's Act with the purpose of increas-
ing benefits to longshoremen and decreasing the number of third-party actions. To
this latter end, section 905(b) was added to the Act. Section 905(b) limited the
longshoreman's remedy against the vessel to a cause of action based on negligence
and eliminated any right of the vessel owner to proceed against the stevedore-employer.
32. The statutory rule of comparative negligence does not apply, however, to a
[Vol. 43
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and liabilities, however, is inherent in the longshoreman-employer-
shipowner relationship, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Edmonds
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique3  The Edmonds Court held in
effect that comparative negligence is compatible with joint and several
liability; therefore, it held that any negligence of the defendant third
party would be sufficient to base judgment against it for the full
amount of damages not attributable to the plaintiffs own negligence."
Any negligence of the employer is disregarded where the defendant
third party is guilty of some negligence, even if as slight as one per-
cent.
Furthermore, the shipowner cannot seek recovery against a
negligent stevedore-employer either directly through contribution or
indirectly through reduction of the employer's compensation lien, since
the employer's liability is limited by the Longshoremen's Act to
compensation.35 Although as a matter of law the 1972 amendments
preclude apportionment of the employer's lien,' the resulting inequities
are so egregious that Congress should never have countenanced them.
In addition, although the idea that a court can apportion the negligence
of a nonparty (the employer) was not argued before the Supreme
Court, the theory is implicit in the majority opinion and is the con-
ceptual basis for the dissent.
section 905(b) action involving an accident on land, even though the plaintiff
longshoreman is engaged in maritime employment and the situs of the accident is
maritime for purposes of the Longshoremen's Act. In that situation, state law governs.
Holland v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 655 F.2d 556, 1981 A.M.C. 2474 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Parker v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 537 F.2d 113, 1976
A.M.C. 2201 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977).
33. 443 U.S. 256, 1979 A.M.C. 1167 (1979). See Stover & Plaetzer, supra note 30,
for a discussion of almost every facet of the employee-shipowner-employer relation-
ship under section 905(b) and Edmonds.
34. 433 U.S. at 263, 271, 1979 A.M.C. at 1172-73, 1179. Plaintiff longshoreman,
employed by a stevedore, was injured while unloading cargo from defendant's vessel.
He received compensation from his stevedore-employer under the Longshoremen's Act.
Plaintiff then brought an action against the vessel owner under section 905(b) of the
Act. A jury found plaintiff 10% responsible for his injuries, the shipowner 20% respon-
sible, and the stevedore-employer, through the negligence of plaintiffs co-worker, 70%
responsible. The trial court reduced plaintiff's recovery by 10% but refused to reduce
further the award against the vessel owner in proportion to the fault of the stevedore-
employer. The Fourth Circuit, en banc, reversed. 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978). The
Supreme Court reversed by a 5-3 vote, reinstating the finding of the trial court.
35. 443 U.S. at 261, 1979 A.M.C. at 1170-71.
36. Even before the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme
Court held that the shipowner could not obtain contribution from a concurrently
negligent tortfeasor-employer. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C.
1 (1953); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 1952
A.M.C. 1 (1952). In Hawn, the Court further found that the shipowner is not entitled
to have the damages against it reduced by the amount of the employer's compensa-
tion payments. 346 U.S. at 411-12, 1954 A.M.C. at 8-9.
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In a footnote in Edmonds, the Supreme Court noted, "In many
cases, of course, the shipowner whose act or omission contributed on-
ly a very small percentage of the total negligence will avoid liability
on the ground of lack of causation." 7 The meaning of this dictum is
unclear. It seems to confuse fault with causation; i.e., a finding of a
"small percentage of the total negligence" might add up to a finding
of "lack of causation." This language sounds dangerously like the il-
logical "major-minor" fault rule that supposedly disappeared with
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.8 Quite naturally, shipowners'
counsel, frustrated by Edmonds, have cited this footnote on the chance
that the Supreme Court has left them a ray of light." Under the Long-
shoremen's Act, where the employer is proceeding as the statutory
assignee or "subrogee"45 under section 933 or is merely seeking reim-
bursement of its compensation lien,41 any negligence of the employee
will be imputed to the employer or its insurance carrier. 2 In an ac-
tion by a negligent employer against a negligent shipowner outside
section 933, comparative negligence applies.43
Wrongful Death
The first situation to be examined under wrongful death is that
of a seaman's beneficiaries suing his employer for negligence. In such
a case, the beneficiaries' sole remedy is under the Jones Act;44
therefore, comparative negligence is applicable.
In other wrongful death situations not involving seamen, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between deaths occurring on the high seas and
37. 443 U.S. at 265 n.15, 1979 A.M.C. at 1174 n.15.
38. 421 U.S. 397, 406-07, 1975 A.M.C. 541, 548-49 (1975). See Getty Oil Co. v. Steam-
ship Ponce De Leon, 555 F.2d 328, 1977 A.M.C. 711 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. See Di Rago v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 860, 864-65, 1982 A.M.C.
26, 31-32 (3d Cir. 1981); Bednarek v. Thore Shipping, A.B., 1982 A.M.C. 240, 243 (D.
Md. 1981).
40. Although the statute describes the legal relationship as one of "assignment,"
the Supreme Court has interpreted it as one of "subrogation." Federal Marine Ter-
minals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 1969 A.M.C. 745 (1969). Apparent-
ly this is a distinction without a difference.
41. Mitchell v. The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 1943 A.M.C. 1126 (3d Cir. 1943).
42. See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404,
414 n.14, 1969 A.M.C. at 752 n.14 (1969). But cf. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Asperula
Shipping Co., Ltd., 1982 A.M.C. 2803 (D. Md. 1981) (Burnside did not survive the 1972
Amendments.)
43. This conclusion follows logically from the premise established in Burnside that
the stevedore-employer has a "direct" (not simply derivative) cause of action against
the shipowner, although in that particular case the employer was deemed faultless.
Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 418, 1969 A.M.C.
at 755 (1969).
44. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 1965 A.M.C. 1 (1964).
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deaths occurring in local waters. Deaths on the high seas are governed
by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).45 The DOHSA, enacted
in 1920, provides for recovery for death resulting from "wrongful act,
neglect, or default."4 Section 766 of the DOHSA incorporates the doc-
trine of comparative negligence: "In suits under this chapter the fact
that the decedent has been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar recovery, but the court shall take into consideration the degree
of negligence attributable to the decedent and reduce the recovery
accordingly."47
Where a death occurs in local waters, a cause of action for
wrongful death exists under the general maritime law. This general
maritime law wrongful death action was created by the Supreme Court
in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.," impliedly overruling prior
Supreme Court cases which invoked local death acts and their com-
mon law contributory negligence bars." The Fifth Circuit has deter-
mined that comparative negligence applies to wrongful death actions
in local waters even if contributory negligence is a bar under state
law.'
Actions Against the United States
Actions against the United States may be brought under the Suits
in Admiralty Act,5' the Public Vessels Act,52 the Federal Tort Claims
Act,' or any combination of the three. These statutes do not prescribe
any rule regarding the plaintiff's negligence. Applicable rules of.
general maritime law and statutes, including comparative negligence,
therefore should apply.
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS LIABLE WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of comparative negligence may be invoked in two
45. 46 U.S.C. SS 761-768 (1976).
46. Id. S 761.
47. Id. S 766.
48. 398 U.S. 375, 1970 A.M.C. 967 (1970).
49. See Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 1960 A.M.C. 527 (1960); The Tungus
v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 1959 A.M.C. 813 (1959).
50. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865, 1970 A.M.C. 1841 (5th Cir. 1970). See
generally Edelman, Recovery for Wrongful Death Under General Maritime Law, 55 TUL.
L. REV. 1123 (1981).
51. 46 U.S.C. SS 741-752 (1976).
52. 46 U.S.C. SS 781-790 (1976).
53. 28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
54. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 A.M.C. 541 (1975)
(Suits in Admiralty Act and Federal Tort Claims Act); Maurer v. United States, 668
F.2d 98, 1982 A.M.C. 884 (2d Cir. 1981) (Public Vessels Act).
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situations in which a negligent plaintiff sues a defendant liable without
negligence: unseaworthiness and products liability. Unseaworthiness
is "a species of liability without fault ...a form of absolute duty.""5
Although strictly speaking, "comparative negligence" therefore should
not be applicable in actions by seamen against their employers for
unseaworthiness, this conceptual problem has never bothered the
admiralty courts in applying the rule. A seaman's damages are always
mitigated in proportion to his contributory negligence, even in an
unseaworthiness case. 6
The rights of seamen and others against third parties have been
litigated primarily in the area of products liability. Specifically, the
concept of strict liability in tort has raised the same conceptual prob-
lem as did the application of comparative negligence in unseaworthi-
ness cases. Here, the admiralty courts have had more trouble, largely
because of their hesitancy simply in recognizing strict tort liability.
It is sufficient to date the appearance of strict tort liability in ad-
miralty from the 1945 appellate decision in Sieracki v. Seas Shipping
Co.5" Although not sounding in negligence, strict liability is now well
established as a cause of action in tort to which the contractual
defenses of a breach of warranty case are not applicable. 9 The doc-
55. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 704 (1946)
(citations omitted).56. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429, 1939 A.M.C. 1, 8 (1939);
The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 112, 1936 A.M.C. 627, 630-31 (1936). The same
was true of longshoremen until their cause of action for unseaworthiness was abolished
by the 1972 amendments. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C.
1 (1953).
57. It should be noted that the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act
eliminated a covered employee's cause of action against a "vessel" not only for unseawor-
thiness but also for all other forms of strict liability. For example, the nondelegable
duty of a vessel to provide a longshoreman with a safe place to work was eliminated
by the amendments. Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072, 1077, 1979 A.M.C. 1703,
1708 (4th Cir. 1978); Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1978 A.M.C.
331 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
58. 149 F.2d 98, 99-100, 1945 A.M.C. 407, 412 (3d Cir. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 85,
1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946). The trial court found the manufacturer of a shackle which
failed, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff longshoreman, liable under a theory of pro-
ducts liability. Although it found the vessel owner not liable under a theory of pro-
ducts liability, the court of appeals determined that the vessel owner was liable for
unseaworthiness. The court of appeals further noted that strict liability principles had
become so widely accepted as to be construed as part of the general law of torts,
maritime as well as common law. 149 F.2d at 99-100, 1945 A.M.C. at 411-12.
59. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 1974 A.M.C. 1341
(8th Cir. 1972) (Navy pilot, i.e., seaman); McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 1966
A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965) (passengers); Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 502 (1971). See Kuffler,
Products Liability Afloat, 1976 LLOYD'S MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 33.
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trine of comparative negligence, or more accurately, "comparative
fault," applies to strict liability in tort.0
SITUATIONS WHERE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS NOT INVOKED
Seaman's Right to Maintenance and Cure
Where a seaman is guilty of willful misconduct which is the sole
cause of his injury or illness, such willful misconduct is a complete
bar to his right to recover maintenance and cure. There is no
apportionment." Such a situation could occur where a seaman became
intoxicated and that intoxication was the sole cause of the accident.
On the other hand, a seaman's claim is not barred by his negligence
even if it is the sole cause of his illness or injury. 2 However, where
a seaman, his employer, and a third-party defendant are all con-
tributorily negligent, there may be apportionment between the
employer and the third-party defendant and contribution allowed.8
Accidents on Offshore Platforms
The maritime rule of comparative negligence does not apply to
accidents occurring on offshore platforms, wherever located. In
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," the Supreme Court held
that accidents occurring on offshore platforms were not within federal
admiralty jurisdiction. In such situations, state law applies, as deter-
60. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1978
A.M.C. 2315 (9th Cir. 1977) (property damage); Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation
Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969) (seaman). See Edelman, An Overview of Products Liability
Law in a Maritime Context, 5 MAR. LAW. 159, 171 (1980). In Pan-Alaska, a vessel owner
pro hac vice filed an action against the vessel repairer, the vessel engine manufac-
turer, and the vessel engine franchised dealer for loss of the vessel because of an
engine room fire. The fire was caused by the malfunction of two fuel filters. In revers-
ing the trial court, the Ninth Circuit first noted that the doctrine of strict liability
should have been applied to the vessel engine franchised dealer. The court then deter-
mined that the vessel owner was contributorily negligent for a number of reasons,
mostly as a result of the crew's negligence in failing to prevent and properly fight
the fire. Finally, the court stated that contributory negligence was compatible with
strict products liability. "It comes down to this: the defendant is strictly liable for
the harm caused from his defective product, except that the award of damages shall
be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to his own loss or injury." 565
F.2d at 1139, 1978 A.M.C. at 2330.
61. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 1951 A.M.C. 416 (1951); Aguilar v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 1943 A.M.C. 451 (1943). See generally Shields, Seamen's Rights
to Recover Maintenance and Cure Benefits, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1046, 1052-54 (1981).
62. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 1949 A.M.C. 613 (1949).
63. Adams v. Texaco, Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 1982 A.M.C. 1004 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. 395 U.S. 352, 1969 A.M.C. 1082 (1969).
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mined in accordance with normal choice of law rules."5 The law of a
particular state could provide, and indeed is likely to provide, for com-
parative negligence."
Longshoreman's or Harbor Worker's Claim for Compensation Under
the Longshoremen's Act
In connection with a workman's compensation claim, there is no
apportionment because the negligence of the employee or employer
is irrelevant. Compensation is "payable irrespective of fault as a cause
for the injury. '"67 The claim is barred, however, if the injury was
"occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful
intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another."68 Con-
tributory negligence is not a defense even where the employee can
sue the employer for his failure to secure payment of compensation."
Successive Accidents
There is no apportionment between successive accidents. A plain-
tiffs recovery for damages caused by the defendant cannot be reduced
because of a preexisting disability resulting from a previous injury.7
The defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The reconciliation of the common law concept of assumption of
risk7 ' with the doctrine of comparative negligence in admiralty remains
65. Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F2d 398, 1982 A.M.C. 2053 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Louisiana law before the 1979 act which adopted comparative negligence).
66. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
67. 33 U.S.C. S 904(b) (1976).
68. Id. S 903(b).
69. Id. S 905(a).
70. Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 1982 A.M.C. 884 (2d Cir. 1981) (different
ships, same employer); cf. Wilkinson v. D/S A/S Den Norska, 538 F.2d 327, 1976 A.M.C.
2615 (4th Cir. 1976) (different ships, different employers) (unreported in F.2d).
71. At common law, assumption of risk existed where an injured plaintiff was
without fault but nevertheless assumed the consequences of his injuries. Prosser has
classified three types of assumption of risk situations:
[1.] the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a
known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. ...
[2.1 the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant, with
knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against the risk. ...
[3.] the plaintiff, aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defen-
dant, proceeds voluntarily to encounter it-as where he has been supplied with
a chattel which he knows to be unsafe, and proceeds to use it after he has discovered
the danger.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 68 at 440 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff's assumption of the risk bars his action. Id. at 441.
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in a state of disarray. The courts have failed to develop a consistent,
logical doctrine for handling assumption of risk. Generally, however,
assumption of risk is not a defense and should not be considered in
apportionment.
The defense of assumption of risk has been abolished for
longshoremen and seamen. The 1972 amendments to the
Longshoremen's Act confirmed the abolition of the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk for purposes of section 905(b)."2 The defense of assump-
tion of risk was abolished for seamen by the Supreme Court in The
Arizona v. Anelich,73 even before Congress abolished it for railroad
workers in 1939. Subsequently, in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith,"4
the Supreme Court addressed the novel question of whether assump-
tion of risk was a defense where a seaman's injuries were caused by
a defective appliance and the seaman had a chance to avoid the use
of the defective appliance by the free choice of a available safe one.
In holding that assumption of risk did not bar the plaintiff's action
but that negligent choice could be considered in mitigation of damages,
the Court stated that "[any rule of assumption of risk in admiralty
... must be applied in conjunction with the established admiralty doc-
trine of comparative negligence and in harmony with it."75
Congress amended the FELA (and thereby the Jones Act) in 1939
by adding the following language to section 54: "[W]here such injury
or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of
the officers, agents or employees of such carrier; and no employee
shall be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any
case."7 In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,77 the Supreme
Court relied on the amended language in holding that "every vestige
of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by
the 1939 amendment."'78 The Court further stated that cases should
"be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever
existed"79 and that assumption of risk "must not . . . be allowed
72. Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera, S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 1977 A.M.C. 2433
(W.D. Wash. 1977).
73. 298 U.S. 110, 1936 A.M.C. 627 (1936). The court noted that although "the seaman
assumes [risks] normally incident to his perilous calling .... the nature of his calling,
the rigid discipline to which he is subject, and the practical difficulties of his avoiding
exposure to risks of unseaworthiness and defective appliances" render the defense
of assumption of risk, as distinguished from contributory negligence, peculiarly inap-
plicable to suits by seamen to recover for the negligent failure to provide a seaworthy
ship and safe appliances. 298 U.S. at 122-23, 1936 A.M.C. at 633.
74. 305 U.S. 424, 1939 A.M.C. 1 (1939).
75. 305 U.S. at 431, 1939 A.M.C. at 7 (emphasis added).
76. 45 U.S.C. S 54 (1976). The original FELA (1908) had abolished the defense only
in actions for violation of the Safety Appliances Act..
77. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
78. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 64.
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recrudescence under any other label in the common law lexicon."8
Unfortunately, many of the lower courts, at least in admiralty,
have paid insufficient attention to the clear mandate of Socony-Vacuum
and Tiller, and as a result, the cases have proliferated. All too often,
the courts seem to start with a subjective determination as to whether
the plaintiff's course of conduct is assumption of risk or negligence,81
rather than following the Supreme Court's intention that the conduct
of the parties should be considered only under the principles of com-
parative negligence.82 By focusing first on the plaintiff's conduct in
accepting a dangerous condition, a court can reintroduce the doctrine
of assumption of risk under the label of contributory negligence." If
the court feels that the plaintiff should win, it will label his conduct
"assumption of risk." If the court feels that the plaintiff should pay
for his sins, it will label his conduct "negligence."' Thus, legal analysis
is reduced to a game of semantics.
One solution to avoid continued shifts in terminology was offered
by the Tenth Circuit in Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co.:85 "To deter-
mine whether [a] plaintiff [is] guilty of contributory negligence we must
focus on his actions after he assumed the risk of working . . . since
the defense of contributory negligence requires evidence of some
negligent act or omission by the plaintiff other than his knowledgeable
80. Id. at 67.
81. The Fourth Circuit has stated that continuing to draw "[tihe distinction [bet-
ween assumption of risk and negligence] is critical." Sessler v. Allied Towing Corp.,
538 F.2d 630, 632, 1976 A.M.C. 1801, 1803 (4th Cir. 1976). Gilmore and Black call this
distinction "the two heap rule":
When courts are required to sort cases into two heaps without being given
a workable formula for distinguishing between the cases which are to go in'the
assumption of risk heap and those that are to go in the contributory negligence
heap, results like those we have been reviewing [from the lower courts] are to
be expected. The important thing to bear in mind is that the courts have indeed
been maintaining the two heap rule.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY S 6-27a, at 357 (2d ed. 1975).
82. Socony-Vacuum, 305 U.S. at 431, 1939 A.M.C. at 7; Tiller, 318 U.S. at 65-68.
83. Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 1982 A.M.C. 1823 (10th Cir. 1981);
Byrd v. Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d 324
(5th Cir. 1982); Sessler v. Allied Towing Corp., 538 F.2d 630, 1976 A.M.C. 1801 (4th
Cir. 1976); Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 1973 A.M.C. 602 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Rivera v. Rederi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970, 1973
A.M.C. 804 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972). The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
and Tenth Circuit courts each determined that a district court within their jurisdic-
tion had substantively injected the doctrine of assumption of risk into the issues of
the case under the guise of contributory negligence. See also Hall v. American S.S.
Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1982).
84. See, e.g., Bryant v. Partenreederei-Ernest Russ, 352 F.2d 614, 1966 A.M.C. 607
(4th Cir. 1965).
85. 651 F.2d 676, 1982 A.M.C. 1823 (10th Cir. 1981).
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acceptance of a dangerous condition."8 The authors would take this
analysis one step further by eliminating any initial consideration of
the assumed risks of working. The plaintiff should be subjected sole-
ly to a comparative fault analysis. Any dangers he negligently assumed
in the performance of his duties should be calculated as part of his
comparative fault. The focus of analysis, 'therefore, should be on an
act or omission that deviates from the conduct of the average
reasonable employee similarly situated. Thus, given the peculiar facts
of any situation, the dangers an employee assumes in performing his
duties are simply examined in light of what the average employee
would do. Where the plaintiff's action or failure to act deviates from
the conduct of an average reasonable employee, the plaintiff is guilty
of contributory negligence, which may be as much as one hundred
percent."
Maritime employment is inherently risky; therefore, it follows that
there is an element of assumption of risk in most maritime tort cases.
A seaman assumes the risk of being thrown against a bulkhead when
the ship rolls, but the proper rationale for dismissing his action is
that the shipowner was not negligent and the ship was not unseawor-
thy. On the other hand, if a seaman chooses to use a patently
dangerous route when a safe one is available, he is chargeable with
negligence.8 The authors strongly maintain that the term "assump-
tion of risk" should be banned from the courtroom. Any lawyer who
uses it should be held in contempt, and any judge who uses it should
be summarily reversed. In Tiller, the Supreme Court evidenced equally
strong feelings, but with no noticeable effect.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The concept of last clear chance developed in the common law
as an antidote to contributory negligence when the latter was a total
bar to recovery.8 It has never been fully accepted in admiralty, part-
ly as the result of greater emphasis upon cause-in-fact. 8 In addition,
last clear chance has been used to circumvent the inequitable rule
86. 651 F.2d at 682-83, 1982 A.M.C. at 1829 (citing Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc.,
474 F.2d 255, 257-58, 1973 A.M.C. 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1974)).
87. See Manning v. M/V Sea Road, 358 F.2d 615, 1966 A.M.C. 591 (5th Cir. 1965).
88. Palermo v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 355 U.S. 20, 1957 A.M.C. 2275 (1957) (per
curiam); cf. Smith v. United States, 336 F.2d 165, 1965 A.M.C. 153 (4th Cir. 1964).
89. At common law, the doctrine of last clear chance holds that if the defendant
has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's contributory negligence
is not a proximate cause of the result. W. PROSSER, supra note 71, S 66. The doctrine
developed as a modification of the strict rule of contributory negligence.
90. Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 1982 A.M.C. 1823 (10th Cir. 1981)
(approving Spinks); Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975); G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 81, S 7-5.
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of divided damages. As such, the doctrine of last clear chance should
not survive Reliable Transfer.91 Because it undermines the very ob-
jective of comparative negligence-the allocation of damages based
on comparative fault-last clear chance is incompatible with com-
parative negligence.9" Any contributory fault of a defendant in ignor-
ing his last clear chance to avoid injuring a plaintiff should merely
be considered in the apportionment.13
METHODS OF APPORTIONMENT AMONG TORTFEASORS
Contribution and Tort Indemnity
Contribution and tort indemnity are two methods of allocating loss
among defendant tortfeasors. Contribution is a method of distributing
loss by requiring one tortfeasor to pay part of the damages awarded
to another. This principle is part of the general maritime law and
is not dependent upon statutes such as the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. 4 Before the Supreme Court's decision in
Reliable Transfer, contribution was made on a pro rata basis. Three
months after that decision, the Third Circuit applied the Reliable
Transfer comparative fault approach to the situation of a defendant
seeking contribution from a co-defendant in a personal injury case. 5
Contribution based on comparative degrees of fault is the established
rule today. 6
Indemnity is an all-or-nothing remedy that shifts the entire loss
from one tortfeasor to another. Tort indemnity envisions a comparison
of the fault of each defendant tortfeasor in relation to the injured
party. Before Reliable Transfer, a passively (secondarily) negligent tort-
feasor could recover full indemnity from the actively (primarily)
negligent tortfeasor The Fifth and Eighth Circuits recently have
91. See Dale, Apportionment of Liability in the Aftermath of Reliable, 1978
SOUTHEAST ADMIRALTY LAW INSTITUTE (Program Materials); Note, Admiralty: Com-
parative Negligence in Collision Cases, 36 LA. L. REV. 288 (1975).
92. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE S 7.3 at 140 (1974 & Supp. 1981);
Comment, Comparative Negligence in the United States-The Advent of its Adoption in
Louisiana, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1217, 1227-29 (1977).
93. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rico Lighterage Co., 553 F.2d 728, 1977 A.M.C.
850 (1st Cir. 1977); Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466, 1960 A.M.C. 1221
(5th Cir. 1959). Under section 1(a) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, last clear
chance is a factor in the apportionment. 12 U.L.A. 34 (1977).
94. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 1974 A.M.C.
537 (1974).
95. Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 1975 A.M.C. 2527
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
96. Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246, 1980 A.M.C. 288 (5th Cir.
1979).
97. Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 1969
A.M.C. 767 (5th Cir. 1969).
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held that this remedy is still available.98 The better reasoned cases,
however, hold that the rationale of Reliable Transfer "is strongly at
odds" with that of tort indemnity. "[T]he preferable approach would
be to apply the comparative fault principles endorsed in Reliable
Transfer.""
Apportionment of Fault Against Absentee Tortfeasors
Apportionment of fault where all tortfeasors are not in court may
occur when one tortfeasor is not subject to process in the jurisdic-
tion, is bankrupt, or is a Longshoremen's Act employer. The issue
raised is whether the court can nevertheless assess the fault of such
a "phantom defendant." The courts have assessed such fault routinely
and without discussion, but they, of course, have been unable to enter
judgment against the absentee tortfeasor.1° In Ebanks v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., °' however, the Eleventh Circuit has recently re-
fused to apportion against an absentee tortfeasor even though he was
a third-party defendant.
Another frequent instance of the absentee tortfeasor occurs when
one tortfeasor has settled with the plaintiff and is given a release
or convenant not to sue, with the plaintiff going to trial against the
nonsettlor. Before Reliable Transfer, the defendant generally was en-
titled to a credit for the amount paid by the settlor. In the wake
of Reliable Transfer, the prevailing approach now is to apportion the
fault of the defendant and the settlor and to allow a credit sufficient
to charge the defendant with his proportion of the fault. "'
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Reliable Transfer did not change the long-established admiralty
98. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460, 465-66 (1981), rev'd en banc on other
grounds, 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Riverway
Harbor Serv. St. Louis, Inc., 639 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1981) (property damage).
99. Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 130, 1980 A.M.C.
833, 851 (3d Cir. 1979). See Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1982); Gorman, Indemnity and Contribution Under Maritime Law, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1165,
1196 (1981). Cf. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460, 465-66 (1981), rev'd en banc
on other grounds, 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982). In Loose, the Fifth Circuit found it "dif-
ficult to see the need for the active-passive indemnification rule in a comparative fault
system" that "not only eliminates the doctrine of contributory negligence but also
apportions fault among joint tortfeasors in accordance with a precise determination,
not merely equally or all-or-none." 670 F.2d at 501-02 (footnotes omitted).
100. E.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 1979
A.M.C. 1167 (1979).
101. 688 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1982). Cf. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT S 2(a), 12 U.L.A.
36 (1977) (apportionment allowed as to third-party defendants and persons released).
102. Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246, 1980 A.M.C. 288 (5th Cir.
1979); Doyle v. United States, 441 F.Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977). Cf. Wheeler v. Bonnin,
47 Or. App. 645, 615 P.2d 355, 1982 A.M.C. 1739 (1980).
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rule that tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable"' for full damages
without apportionment.1 14 Under article 4 of the Brussels Collision Con-
vention of 19 10 ,M in force almost everywhere except the United States,
both vessels in mutual fault collisions are jointly and severally liable
for personal injury or death.
PROCEDURE IN APPORTIONMENT
In the apportionment of fault under the comparative negligence
doctrine, should the court compare causation or culpability?
Theoretically, causation is an absolute, not apportionable by degrees
unless there are distinct harms.0 ' Prosser has commented that "once
causation is found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of
comparative fault rather than comparative contribution.""1 On the
other hand, Wade has commented that "[iln any event, consideration
needs to be given not only to the measure of culpability but also to
the relative closeness of the causal relation between the actor's con-
duct and the injury."'0 8 In Reliable Transfer, the Supreme Court did
not decide the instant question but merely restated the obvious pro-
position that faults to be compared must have contributed to the
damages.0 9 Fault in the abstract must be disregarded."10 Each fault
must have a causal connection.' Two decisions by the same lower
federal court have held that liability is apportioned by culpability, not
by degree of causation.1 ' The earlier of these decisions was reversed
by the Ninth Circuit in Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construc-
103. The concept of joint and several liability holds that an injured plaintiff may
institute action agaiust any one or all of the contributorily negligent tortfeasors. In
such a case, liability is joint in the sense that all the tortfeasors are responsible for
the injury, and several, in the sense that each tortfeasor may be held fully liable for
the plaintiff's injury. See W. PROSSER, supra note 71, S 46.
104. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. at 260, 1979 A.M.C.
at 1169-70 (technically a covered employer is not a "tortfeasor" and the liability is
not "joint"); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
105. Unification of Certain Rules of Law With Respect to Collision Between Vessels,
Sept. 23, 1910, in 4 UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 181.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 433A (1965); Pearson, Apportionment of
Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV.
343, 345-49 (1980).
107. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 481 (footnote omitted).
108. Wade, supra note 6, at 341.
109. 421 U.S. at 411, 1975 A.M.C. at 552.
110. Board of Comm'rs v. MJV Farmsum, 574 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1978).
111. Inter-Cities Navigation Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 1079, 1980 A.M.C.
2831 (5th Cir. 1979).
112. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. O/S East Point, 421 F. Supp, 48, 1976 A.M.C. 2228
(W.D. Wash. 1976); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 402
F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Wash. 1975), rev'd, 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
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tion & Design Co."' The court discussed the "semantical" problem at
some length and favorably referred to the term "comparative
causation... 4 Subsequently; in Hosei Kaiun Shoji Co. v. Tug Seaspan
Monarch, another federal district court handed down the Solomonic
judgment that both causation and culpability must be present."5
The importance of causal connection was emphasized in The S.S.
Helena."' In that case, Judge Alvin B. Rubin assigned sixty-five per-
cent to the fault that was "the immediate cause of the collision.'. 7
However, it seems implicit in his decision that he weighed both causa-
tion and culpability:
It is profitless to attempt to weigh fault against fault as if each
shortcoming could be measured in some sort of scale. Both vessels
were at fault and actively so. The errors of neither were minor.
Each vessel committed acts that contributed to the collision. No
single act of either can be completely disentangled. But the White
Alder's unexplained sheer into the course of the Helena was the
fateful and final act of negligence."8
A district judge in the Fifth Circuit has been even more specific: "In
calculating the degree of fault, the court must consider, under basic
common law tort principles, the blameworthiness of each vessel and
the extent to which the vessel contributed to the accident.""' 9 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York has said
the same thing in different words: "The apportionment of fault in the
proportions chosen is not simply a mechanical computation based on
counting of errors, although such an account is a factor to be con-.
sidered. More importantly, the chosen apportionment reflects this
court's considered judgment as to the quality and gravity of each
party's negligence.' 20
The procedure in the English Admiralty is well established. Both
"blameworthiness" and "causative potency" are weighed. 2' The English
procedure has been approved in the United States.22 Furthermore,
113. 565 F.2d 1129, 1978 A.M.C. 2315 (9th Cir. 1977).
114. 565 F.2d at 1139, 1978 A.M.C. at 2330.
115. 1981 A.M.C. 2162 (D. Or. 1980).
116. 1976 A.M.C. 2013 (E.D. La. 1976).
117. Id. at 2021.
118. Id. at 2021-22.
119. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Tug Captain Vick, 443 F. Supp. 722, 732 n.1,
1979 A.M.C. 1404, 1417 n.1 (E.D. La. 1977) (emphasis added).
120. Etheridge v. M/V Hellenic Laurel, 1977 A.M.C. 2453, 2457 (S.D. N.Y. 1977)
(emphasis added).
121. Brandon, Apportionment of Liability in British Courts Under the Maritime Con-
ventions Act of 1911, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1977).
122. Afran Transp. Co. v. SIT Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
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it appears very similar to the apportionment procedure prescribed
in section 2(b) of the UCFA: "In determining the percentages of fault,
the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each
party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the con-
duct and the damages claimed." '23 The above cases, with the excep-
tion of Pan-Alaska Fisheries, involved collisions. There is no apparent
reason why the same procedure could not be followed in a personal
injury case, at least one tried before the court. In a jury case, a de-
tailed charge on the two elements of causation and culpability prob-
ably would be confusing. It would seem preferable to submit simply
the usual interrogatory: "To what extent expressed in terms of percen-
tage did the negligence of the plaintiff (defendant) contribute to the
happening of the accident?" Forms of instructions are set forth in the
federal practice manuals." On a general verdict, a jury is likely to
disregard a plaintiff's negligence. '25 It is therefore essential to use
special interrogatories.128
The trial court must make specific findings on the parties' pro-
portionate degrees of fault. '27 On appeal, the apportionment is subject
to the "clearly erroneous" rule. '28
Graveland-Grace McAllister, 1980 A.M.C. 1839 (1980) (R.H. Brown, Arb.); A. PARKS,
THE LAW OF TUG, Tow, AND PILOTAGE 239-41 (2d ed. 1982).
123. 12 U.L.A. 37 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 132-34, infra. See
the Commissioner's Comment to section 2(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
regarding percentage of fault, 12 U.L.A. 37. See also Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. The
M/V Maryland Clipper, 599 F.2d 1313, 1979 A.M.C. 2649 (4th Cir. 1979). In that case,
the district court found both vessels negligent in contributing to a collision. One vessel
was negligent in posting a lookout but ordering the lookout not to call the bridge.
The other vessel was negligent in failing to post a lookout. Is the vessel that posted
a lookout less culpable than the vessel that did not post a lookout, especially in light
of the lookout's orders? Did the posting of the "silent" lookout or the failure to post
a lookout at all contribute to the collision? The issue raised by these questions is
that of determining the relationship between the conduct and the resulting damage.
It is to this end that section 2(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is addressed.
124. 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS SS
94.18, 94.20, 94.21 & 94.28 (1977 & Supp. 1981); 1B A. SANN, S. BELLMAN, N. GOLDEN,
& B. CHOASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY S 25, at 3-124-33 (7th ed. 1982); United States
Fifth Circuit District Judges Association, Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) 53,
57, 107 & 115 (West 1980). One form of interrogatory not worthy of emulation asked:
"[Wihat percentage of the cause of the accident do you attribute to plaintiffs negligence,
if any?" Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1969)
(emphasis added).
125. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 482-84.
126. Id. at 497-503.
127. Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. M/V Maryland Clipper, 599 F.2d 1313, 1979 A.M.C.
2649 (4th Cir. 1979).
128. Mac Towing, Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, 670 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1982);
Alkmeon Naviera, S.A. v. M/V Marina L, 633 F.2d 789, 1982 A.M.C. 153 (9th Cir. 1980).
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FOREIGN AND STATE LAW
The United Kingdom and most of the Canadian provinces, in-
cluding Quebec, have adopted by statute comparative negligence ap-
plicable in maritime cases." Thirty-eight states have adopted some
form of comparative negligence. Ip the Fourth Circuit, only West
Virginia has adopted comparative negligence. In the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, only Alabama has not. Mississippi adopted com-
parative negligence in 1910;' 10 Louisiana adopted comparative
negligence in 1980.'11 A great body of jurisprudence and legal literature
has been built up in the states, and most of it is readily transferable
to the admiralty as a result of Reliable Transfer.
Particular mention should be made of the UCFA."'3 This Act was
drafted over a five-year period by a distinguished group headed by
Professor John W. Wade."= Although it has not yet been adopted by
any state, this Act is a model for the admiralty courts to follow when
a novel question is presented. Such a procedure would be analogous
to the resort by admiralty courts to the Restatements in order to fill
gaps in the maritime law."u
CONCLUSION
We have in comparative negligence a seed planted by the Supreme
Court in 1890 in The Max Morris and nurtured by the lower federal
courts, with the fruit ripened and plucked eighty-five years later in
Reliable Transfer. During that period, the only original contributions
by Congress were the passage of the FELA in 1908, brought into
the admiralty by the Jones Act in 1920, and the DOHSA. 135 The evolu-
tion of the doctrine of comparative negligence is a fine example of
the remarkable ability of the admiralty courts, both English and
129. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, S 1.3; Wright, Recovery for Personal Injury and
Death Claims Under the Laws of the United Kingdom, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1200, 1207-08
(1981).
130. MISS. CODE ANN. S 11-7-15 (1972).
131. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
132. See-supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note
92, S 21.4 (1981 Supp.); Wade, supra note 6, at 307-17; Pearson, supra note 106, at
343 n.4, 364.
133. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act has been extensively commented on by
Professor Wade. 13 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1982) (Commissioner's notes prepared by Wade);
Wade, supra note 6, at 299-318; Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978); Wade, A Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act-What Should it Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 220 (1977).
134. E.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 1979
A.M.C. 824 (5th Cir. 1978).
135. The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act more than offset Congress's
contribution through the FELA.
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American, to adjust to new conditions and to develop new doctrines
necessary to insure justice. 36
136. Excepting only assumption of risk. See discussion at supra notes 71-88 and
accompanying text.
